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THIRD PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES: THE RIGHT TO EXCULPATE
The fourth amendment protects individuals
from governmental interference with private
property by prohibiting unreasonable searches
and seizures, and by requiring proof of probable cause before a search warrant will be issued.' The two clauses of the amendment have
been construed to mean that the government
must show probable cause in order to obtain a
warrant, but that a warrant is not required to
validate every search and seizure. 2 Exceptions
to the warrant requirement recognize that in
certain situations a search may be inherently
reasonable.3 For example, if an individual consents to a search or seizure of his property, the
government's search is reasonable and does
not violate the guarantees of the fourth amendment.
The consent exception to the warrant requirement includes situations in which a third
party, not the owner of the premises searched
or the property seized, is permitted to consent
to the search because of his interest in the
property.' Since the search and seizure is
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation. and
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 "[Slearches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendmentsubject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
'I Major exceptions to the warrant requirement
include searches incident to a lawful arrest, searches
conducted in "hot pursuit," searches of abandoned
property, inventory searches, and consent searches.
For a more complete listing of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement, see W. RINGLE, SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS 202-05 (1972).
1 Haddad & Zagel, Arrest, Search & Seizure, in
1
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FOR
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101

(1976) (Section 1, ch. 13). Private searches must be
distinguished from those in which the government is
involved. If the third party in possession of a suspect's
property conducts an entirely private search and
then voluntarily turns the items over to the police,
no fourth amendment analysis is required since the

deemed reasonable without a warrant, there is
no need to make the showing of probable cause
required to obtain a search warrant. The issue
in such cases is rather the atthority of the
third party to give his consent.
search or seizure involved no governmental participation. For example, in United States v. Sherwin,
539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976), a shipping terminal manager discovered allegedly obscene books during an
inventory and turned the books over to government
agents. The court held that the search by the terminal
manager was a 'private search, noting the "total
absence of governmental involvement prior to conpletion of the search." Id. at 6 n.5. The transfer
to the police of the items discovered in the search
was completely voluntar,.
A consensual transfer is by definition not a
seizure .... If a transfer is voluntary, then it is
not a seizure and the fourth amendment's reasonableness standard is simply inapplicable.
Thus we conclude that there is no seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment
%%hen objects discovered in a private search are
voluntarily relinquished to the government.
Id. at 7-8. Occasionally, a private search may be followed by a government seizure. The seizure must
then be justified by the reasonableness standard. In
United States v. Ogden, 485 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 987 (1974), a warrantless search
was justified by the exigent circumstances exception
to the warrant requirement.
The issue of third-party consent arises when there
has been sufficient governmental participation in the
search itself to invoke the Warrant requirement and
the reasonableness standards of the fourth amendment. Generally, the test for determining whether
the participation of the government agents is sufficient to invoke the fourth amendment is whether the
private party, "in light of all the circumstances of the
case, must be regarded as having acted as an instrument or agent of the state." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971). In Coolidge, while the
defendant was at the police station, his wife had
given certain items to the police after they asked if
she had those items in her home. The actions by the
wife were seen as a -'spontaneous, good faith effort
...
to clear him [the defendant] of suspicion." id.
at 490, and the wife's private search therefore did
not invoke the fourth amendment. Factors which
are examined to determine the participation by the
government in a search include governmental knowledge of and acquiescence in the search, and governmental presence at the time the search occurs. See,
e.g., United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d I (9th Cir.
1976) (police viewing materials discovered by private
citizen imlmediately after the search does not constitute a goxernment search).
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Early cases analyzing third-party consent relied on a theory of implied agency, suggesting
that the third party was acting as an agent of
the defendant when he consented to a search.
According to the implied agency analysis, the
person challenging the search is said to have
appointed the third party as his agent With
authority to waive his fourth amendment
rights. 5 The implied agency, or "apparent authority" analysis, was rejected as a rationale for
consent search in Stoner v.California.' In Stoner,
a hotel clerk consented to the search of the
defendant's hotel room. The Supreme Court
held that the clerk did not have the authority
to consent and that the search was therefore
invalid. In dictum, the Court emphasized the
need to avoid the use of an implied agency
theory to resolve fourth amendment questions.
[The rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic
doctrines of "apparent authority."
•.." It was a right, therefore, which only the
petitioner could waive by word or deed, either
directly or through an agent.7
More recent decisions have explained the thirdparty consent exception in terms of assumption
of risk, suggesting that the defendant assumed
the risk that the third party might consent to a
search when he placed his property in the
possession of the third party. Support for the
assumption of risk theory is found in Frazierv.
Cupp" in which the Supreme Court held that
clothing seized from a duffel bag which the
defendant shared with another party could be
admitted as evidence at the defendant's trial.
The Court in Frazier did not propose a general
standard for third-party consent cases, but the
decision was clearly based upon an assumption
of risk theory.
Petitioner argues that Rawls only had actual
permission to use one compartment of the bag
and that he had no authority to consent to a
search of the other compartments. We will not,
however, engage in such metaphysical subtleties
5 For a criticism of the implied agency analysis, see
Comment, The Effect of a Wife's Consent to a Search
and Seizure of the Husband'sProperty, 69 DicK. L. Rzv.
69 (1964); Comment, Third Party Conent to Search and
Seizure; A Reexamination, 20J. PUB. L. 313 (1971).
1 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
7
1d. at 488-89.
3394 U.S. 731 (1969).

in judging the efficacy of Rawls' consent. Petitioner, in allowing Rawls to use the bag and in
leaving it in his house, must be taken to have
assumed the risk that Rawls would allow someone else to look inside.9
The assumption of risk theory still has some
validity today, but has been largely overshadowed by a third-party consent doctrine formulated by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Matlock. 10 The Court stated in Matlock that
authority to consent will be fotind where the
consenting party has a sufficient relationship
to the property to authorize the consent."
Since Matlock, the problem in third-party consent cases has been the interpretation of the
Matlock "sufficient relationship" standard.
Courts have found it necessary to determine
the relationship of a consenting party to the
items which he allows to be searched, in order
to determine whether or not the third party
has the authority to consent to the search.
Assumption of risk may reappear in this analysis, since the defendant's reasonable assumptions play a role in determining the relationship
which the consenting party has to the premises
or goods in his possession."2
9Id. at 740.
10415 U.S. 164 (1974).
1Id. at 171.
2 In United States v. Cook, 530 F.2d 145 (7th Cir.
1976), a defendant who shared a poultry shed with
several other persons was held to have assumed the
risk that they might consent to a search. Mathews,
Third Party ConsentSearches: Some Necessary Safeguards,
10 VAL. U.L. REV. 29, 31 (1976), suggests that the
implied agency analysis maintains its vitality in third
party consent situations. United States v. Eldridge,
302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962), demonstrates the application of the implied agency theory in a third-party
situation. In Eldridge, the defendant had loaned his
car to a friend, Nethercott, and had given Nethercott
the keys to the ignition and the trunk of the car.
Police officers later searched the car with Nethercott's
permission. The court held that the third party,
Nethercott, could validly consent to the search:
[F]or the time being Nethercott was clothed
with rightful possession and control and could
do in respect to the automobile whatever was
reasonable and not inconsistent with its entrustment to him. No restriction was imposed on
him except to return with the car by a certain
hour... . In responding as he did to the police,
Nethercott did not exceed the authority Eldridge had seemingly given him.
Id. at 466. DissentingJudge Boreman argued that the
third party did not possess the authority to consent:
Eldridge did not intend to confer authority
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Several other factors may be important in
determining the relationship of the third-party
consenter to the goods or premises in his possession. For example, in a situation where two
persons are joint occupants of an apartment, a
court may examine the relationship between
the parties to determine if one party can consent to a search of the co-occupant's bedroom.
If the relationship is between parent and child,
the court may allow the parent to, consent to
the search. 1 3 However, between college roommates, the third party's consent may not be
valid. School searches provide yet another example. A school principal may be allowed to
consent to a governmental search of student
lockers, while a teacher's consent in the same
situation might not be held valid.' 4 In such
situations the authority to consent derives from
upon Nethercott to consent to a search of the
car, nor is there any reasonable basis for the
assumption that Nethercott had implied authority to consent to the search on behalf of Eldridge.... As before indicated, I do not think
authority to consent to a police search can be
remotely "implied" from a grant of permission
to use a car for such a short time and such a
limited purpose.
Id. at 467-68. For a discussion of the problems associated with the assumption of risk consent analysis,
see Comment, Third-Part),Consent Searches: An Alternative Analysis, 41 U. CH. L. REV. 121, 131-32 (1973).
13 See, e.g.,
United States v. DiPrima. 472 F.2d 550
(lst Cir. 1973), where the court held that a mother
could consent to a search of her son's bedroom. The
mother was the head of the household, but the
twenty-two year old son aruged that his room was
exclusively his own.
Finally, we remark that "exclusive" possession
is not an absolute term. A hotel clerk may have
a key to a room, and so may the cleaning staff,
but the clerk will not have apparent authority to
consent to a search .... [E]ven if [the son],
living in the bosom of a family, may think of a
room as "his," the overall dominance will be in
his parents.
Id. at 551. A more complete list of individuals usually placed in the position of third-party consenters
(not all of whom may validly consent) includes (a)
landlords and hotel personnel; (b) school officials;
(c) spouses, lovers and mistresses; (d) parents; (e)
brothers' and sisters; (I)hosts and guests; (g) employers and employees; (h) bailees. J. HADDAD, A. MANUAL FOR PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS 102-05 (1976).
11In People y. Overton, 20 N.Y. 2d 360, 229 N.E.
2d 596 (1967), the vice-principal of a high school
searched a student's locker after learning that detectives suspected marijuana might be in the locker.
The principal used his master key to open the locker.
The search was upheld on the ground that the
principal could consent to the search because of the
special relationship between a student and his school.
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(1) the third party's access to or possession of
the property, in combination with (2) the third
party's special relationship to the owner of the
property. The parent's relationship with the
child, in addition to the parent's access to the
child's property, combine to provide the parent
with authority to consent. Similarly, the school
principal's access to school property, along with
his special relationship to the students in his
school, allows him to consent to a search of a
student's locker.
In some instances, however, the third party's
holding of property for another party may
create a suspicion that the third party has been
involved in some criminal activity. Ordinarily,
this situation arises when the third party possesses property that has been given to him by at
suspected criminal. If the third party lacks any
other "special relationship" to the alleged criminal, he cannot easily explain why he is in
possession of the suspect's property. Believing
that he can prove his own innocence by consenting to a police search, the third party allows
the police to search and seize the suspect's
property. The government later asserts that
the consent was authorized by the third party's
exculpatory motive. 15 This comment will attempt to determine whether such an exculpa-

In such a situation, the principal has a dut to search
or consent to a search of the student's locker. Also,
the student had given his combination to the school,
an indication that the student did not have exclusive
possession of the locker. See also In re Christopher
W, 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973), in
which an assistant principal and principal required a
student to open his locker in their presence. The
search was upheld because prevention of the use of
marijuana was clearly within the principal's duties
and the actions taken toward that end were reitsonable.
15The cases in which courts have examined the
third party's motives underlying his consent include
United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 937 (1967), and United States v.
Diggs, 544 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1976). both of which will
be examined in greater detail later in this comment.
Other cases which have at least mentioned the third
party's motive as a factor, although not holding the
motive to be the most significant element supporting
the consent search, include People v. Pranke, 12 Cal.
App. 3d 935, 91 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970) (neighbor
sought to cooperate with police to prevent the possibility of criminal charges arising against him for
possession of stolen property or aiding and abetting
a burglary); United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167
(4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088 (1976)
(mother sought to protect the integrity ofher home);
United States v. Gradowski, 502 F.2d 563 (2d Cir.
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tory interest is a proper element of the thirdparty consent analysis.
EXISTING CASE LAW

The most significant decision by the Supreme
Court in the area of third-party consent
searches is United States v. Matlock. 1 In Matlock,
a suspect in a bank robbery was arrested in the
front yard of a house occupied by the suspect
and a Mrs. Graff. Mrs. Graff admitted the
police officers for a search of the residence
during which they searched a bedroom jointly
occupied by Mrs. Graff and Matlock. Since
only Mrs. Graff had consented to the search of
the premises occupied by the defendant,
Matlock challenged the search and subsequent
seizure of incriminating evidence as violating
his fourth amendment rights. The Supreme
Court held that consent to search could validly
be "obtained from a third party who possessed
common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to
be inspected."7
Matlock is essential to a discussion of thirdparty consent cases because Matlock, although
not dealing with an exculpatory motive, did
announce a standard to determine the validity
of consent in third-party consent situations.
The standard can apparently be met by a
finding of either "common authority" over or
"other sufficient relationship" to the defendant's property. In a footnote, the Court elaborated on the meaning of "common authority,"
distinguishing it from the traditional law of
property:
Common authority is, of course, not to be
implied from the mere property interest a third
1974) (consenter wanted to he rid of any connection
with the defendant); United States v. Gargiso, 456
F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1972) (consenter sought to exculpate
himself fiom suspicion); Leeper v. United States.
446 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1021 (1972) (consenter knew she was in legal jeopardy
and sought to avoid the risk of prosecution); United
States v. Cataldo, 433 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971) (consenter sought to show
that he was not harboring a fugitive); United States
v. Cecere, 333 F. Supp. 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (consenter concerned with possible possession of stolen
property); People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229
N.E.2d 596 (1967) (lack of exculpatory motive indicated by dissent); State v. Edwards, 5 Wash. App.
852, 490 P.2d 1337 (1971) (consenter concerned that
narcotics had been brought into his home).
10415 U.S. 164 (1974).
17 Id. at 171.

party has in the property. The authority which
justifies the third-party consent does not rest
upon the law of property, with its attendant
historical and legal refinements ...

but rests

rather on mutual use of the property by persons
generally having joint access or control for most
purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize
that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to
permit the inspection in his own right and that
the others have assumed the risk that one of
their number might permit the common area to
be searched.' 8
The Court did not explain the phrase "other
sufficient relationship." Some cases have found
the "sufficient relationship" standard to be satisfied by the third party's fear of being implicated in criminal activity through mere possession of a suspect's goods. But an examination
of two such cases, United States v. Botsch'9 and
United States v. Diggs," ° reveals the difficulties
raised by using an exculpatory interest to satisfy
the sufficient relationship standard.
In United States v. Botsch, the defendant was
renting a small shack in order to store fraudulently acquired merchandise. The landlord,
Stein, would usually pay for items delivered to
the shack with money supplied him by Botsch.
When postal authorities appeared at the shack
to investigate Botsch's activities, Stein unlocked
the shack and invited the postal officers to
search the shack.2 ' The search was conducted
without a warrant and was later justified on
the basis of Stein's consent. The Second Circuit
held that the consent was valid and the search
reasonable because Stein's intent was to exculpate himself from any involvement with the
fraudulent activity of Botsch.
Motive was again considered to be a sufficient
relationship to justify consent in United States v.
Diggs. The Reverend Andrew Bradley received
a locked metal box fiom his niece, Christine
Malone, and her common-law husband, Alfred
Diggs. Christine told Bradley and his wife that
the box contained "'stocks and bonds and silver
paper and important papers that they had
saved up for the children.' '"2The Bradleys
were asked to hold the box so that Christine
"Ild. at 171 n.7 (citations omitted).
19364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
937 (1967).
20 544 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1976).
2' The court found that "Stein, without being
urged, covered or imposed upon, invited the inspection." 364 F.2d at 548.
22 544 F.2d at 117 (quoting Transcript
of Suppression Hearing at 75).
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and her husband would not be tempted to
spend the funds. When Reverend Bradley later
learned of Diggs' arrest for bank robbery, he
became concerned that the box in his possession was connected with the bank robbery.
Bradley had not been given a key to the box.
He contacted agents of the FBI who came to
his house and, without a warrant, took part in
a search of the box.
The district court in Diggs found that the
warrantless search violated the fourth amendment since the Bradleys did not have authority
to consent to a search of the locked box.23 A
three-judge panel of the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court's ruling that the evidence
should be suppressed.2 4 The panel applied the
the joint access and control standard of Matlork
and found that the Bradleys lacked authority
to consent because the defendant had retained
the key to the box. Under such circumstances,
the third partv did not have joint access to the
locked box and accordingly did not possess
either common authority over the box or any
other relationship sufficient to authorize consent. The panel rejected the Government', contention that Bradley's interest in exculpating
himself from connection with the robbery could
validate his consent.
Reverend Bradley had a substantial interest in
extricating himself from his unwitting and innocent involvement in the alleged crime .... But

that interest vanished once Bradley notified the
authorities of the existence of the metal box and
the circumstances surrounding his possession of
it. It therefore does not furnish an excuse for
circumventing the warrant requirement.,
The full court did not agree with the panel,
however, and the Third Circuit sitting en banc
vacated the ruling of the district court and
remanded for further findings.2 6 Four judges
of the ten-judge court decided that Bradley
did possess sufficient authority to consent to a
search of the box. 27 The basic premise of the
I United States v. Diggs, 396 F. Supp. 610, 615
(M.D. Pa. 1975).
2'

18 GRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2316 (1976).

25

Id.

" United States v. Diggs. 544 F.2d 116 (3d Cir.
1976). The remand was required because, as the
plurality explained, six judges did not concur in a.
reversal. The plurality and one concurring justice
favored reversal, but the sixth concurring justice
favored a remand foifurther findings relevant to
the property interests involved.
27

d.
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plurality's opinion was that the third party's
right to exculpate himself from involvement in
the crime must prevail over the defendant's
interest in privacy. Two judges concurred with
the plurality's opinion, one finding the search
to be reasonable under the circumstances and
therefore valid, the other concluding that the
search was valid its an inventory search by the

FBI agents. '28 Four dissenters, in a single opinion, argued that the consent was invalid and
that the search was therefore in violation of
29
the fourth amendment.

The Botsch and Diggs decisions represent the
only clear instances in which courts have relied
upon the right to exculpate as justification for
a warrantless consent search. 0 The rationale
employed in those two cases should be con"Id. at 123, 124 (Adams, J., and Gibbons, J.,
concurring).
2

-1 d. at 127.
'0 A third case which relies upon a similar analysis
but does not refer to a specific "right to exculpate" is
People v. Pranke, 12 Cal. App. 3d 935.91 Cal. Rptr.
129 (1970), decided after Botrsch but prior to Dieg%
and Maftlock. The case dealt with a defendant,
Pranke, who had left several of his personal possessions in a neighbor's apartment. The neighbor, Denton, hearing the police knock at Pranke's door, told
them that Pranke had moved. Denton then allowed
the police to search the items that Pranke had left
with Denton. The nature of the search in Pranke
was described by the court:
After the officers had identified themselves
to Denton and explained the purpose of their
visit, Denton informed them that appellant "had
brought some property into his apartment and
was leaving it there until he could move it to the
apartment building where he was living at that
time . . . and he invited us inside to check the
property." Denton directed the officers to "two
suitcases, a box, a large cardboard box." A
jewelry case and an item of jewelry located
therein matched the description of the stolen
property listed in the Clahan burglary report.
Id. at 938, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 130. For procedural
reasons, the Pranke court was never directly confronted with the validity of the police search described above, but the court did indicate "disagreement with appellant's premise that the undisputed
evidence demonstrates such illegality as a matter of
law." Id. at 942, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 133. Dissenting
Judge Roth also addressed the isue:
I am not persuaded by the majoritv that Denton
had the legal authority to authorize the officers
to search appellant's belongings. This right fashioned by the majority for Denton to cooperate
as a citizen and thus lawfully authorize the
search of appellant's property is an innovation
for which the majority cite, no authority and
for which I find no support in logic or policy.
Id. at.948, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (Roth. J., dissenting).
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pared with the standard set forth in Matlock in
order to determine if the right to exculpate is
properly considered in third-party consent situations. This is necessary because Matlock contains the Supreme Court's guidelines for thirdparty consent cases, and in each case, a third
party permitted a governmental search of effects or premises belonging to a suspected
criminal. The question posed by those cases is
whether or not, under Matlock, a third party
may consent to a search merely because the
party is seeking to exculpate himself from criminal suspicion.
SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR THIRD-PARTY
CONSENT

United States v. Matlock made clear that a
third party's authority to consent depends upon
a showing of "common authority over or other
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects
sought to be inspected." 3' In Botsch and Diggs,
the third party's authority to consent seems to
be founded upon two elements: (1) the nere
fact of possession by the third partN and (2) the
interest of the third party in exculpating himself from criminal suspicion, an interest which
arises from the possession of the suspect's
goods and may be termed a "right to exculpate."
The mere possession of the suspect's goods
by the third party is not, by itself, sufficient to
comply with the Matlock standard of required
authority for two reasons. First, if the bailment
alone created a "sufficient relationship" with
the goods to authorize consent, it would be
necessary to rely upon the technical rules of
property law in order to determine the validity
of third-party consent searches. Yet the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the
technical rules of real and personal property
should not be outcome-determinative in criminal law cases. In Chapman v. United States," -'
which held that a landlord could not authorize
the search of a house he had rented to another
individual, the court rejected the Government's
argument that property law should be determinative.
[I]t is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into
the la%% surrounding the constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the
common law in evolving the body of private
property law which, more than almost any other
a' 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
:3 365 U.S. 610 (1961).

branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions
whose validity is largely historical .... [Wle
ought not to bow to them in the fair administration of the criminal law. To(do so would not
comport with our justly proud claim of the
procedural protections accorded to those
charged with crime.'
With respect to third-party consent searches
in particular, the Court said in Matlock that the
authority to consent should not depend upon
distinctions made in the law of property. :4 A
determination that possession alone justified a
consent search would bring questions of property law into the arena of criminal law, a result
which the Supreme Court has clearly sought to
avoid.
A second reason why the bailment alone can
not authorize the third-party consent is that
such a finding would be inconsistent with the
Matlock standard. Matlock requires the third
party to have some common authority over the
property, or some other sufficient relationship
to the property which the police seek to search.
In order to comply with Matlock in a bailnent
situation, it seems necessary to examine in sonie
detail the restrictions the suspect might have
placed upon the third party in order to determine the existence of some "common authority" or "sufficient relationship." This conclusion is supported by the fact that in consent
cases involving bailments the courts have con-.
sistently examined the nature of the bailnent
to determine the third party's authority to
6
consent .3
'Id. at 617 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 266-67 (1958).
-11415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
3 The problems of determining authority to consent by examining the nature of the bailment were
highlighted byJudge Van Dusen, disseming in Dgg,
when he inquired, "Are the constitutional rights of
the bailor to be dependent, for example, on whether
he paid 25o for the bailment?" 544 F.2d at 32 (Van
Dusen,J., dissenting). Williston states that a bailnent
is "the rightful possession of goods by one who is not
the owner." 9 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1030 (3d
ed. W. Jaeger 1967). There are, however, various
types of bailments. such as involuntary and voluntary
bailinents. and in each instance the duty of the party
in possession may differ. It seems that it is distinctions
just like these that the Court has sought to avoid in
the area of criminal law.
-' For examples of instance% in which court% have
examined the authority which the bailor has gr'anted
to the bailee, see United States v. Canada, 527 F.2d
1374 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 867 (1975)
(bailee had sufficient control to consent to ;earch of
suitcase belonging to bailor); United States v. MNen-
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Since the bailment alone does not provide
the third party with authority to consent, the
courts in Botsch and Diggs searched for further indicia of authority which would justify the
third party's consent. In both cases, the courts
found that the third party's interest in exculpating himself from criminal suspicion was
sufficient to justify the consent. In Diggs, the
plurality suggested that the Bradleys' status
changed significantly when they received the
box from Diggs.
When the defendant and Christine Mahone left
the box containing the stolen money with the
Bradleys for safekeeping they thereby involved
the latter in the alleged crime. Therefore, by
doing so they put the Bradleys in a position
where they had a vital personal interest in the
box, a sufficient relationship to it to entitle them
to give such a permission for the search as would
be binding on Diggs. This does not mean, of
course, that it was a property interest which they
were given .3
Similarly, in Botsch, the court found that the
interest of the third party in exculpating himself was a significant factor in creating the
authority to consent: "Because Stein's activities-though innocent-were inextricably in-

tertwined with Botsch's alleged scheme and
cast suspicion upon him, we believe his authorization of the inspection when viewed in its full
context rendered the search reasonable.""8
Both Botsch and Diggs, however, go beyond
the mere suggestion that the consenting third

doza, 473 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1973) (bailee had complete and unrestricted control over property and
could consent); Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d
253 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969)
(bailee's right to possession was not very formal or
durable but there were sufficient indicia of ownership
to authorize the search); United States v. Eldridge,
302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962) (bailee with rightful
possession and control and in possession of keys to
auto could consent); United States v. Mazzella, 295
F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (truck driver, as bailee
in possession, could consent); Wade %'.
Warden, 278
F. Supp. 904 (D. Md. 1968) (wife-bailee in lawful
possession could authorize search); State v. Curley,
171 S.E.2d 699 (S.C. 1970) (bailee with keys to auto
could, without further prohibitions consent); State v.
Bernius, 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964)
(bailee in possession and control of auto could consent).
544 F.2d at 121-22.
364 F.2d at 548.
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party has an interest in exculpating himself
which authorizes the consent. Each opinion
elevates that interest to the status of a right, the
"right to exculpate." In Diggs, this right to
exculpate is seen as prevailing over a countervailing right of privacy:
[T]he right of the custodian of the defendant's
property who has been unwittingly involved by
the defendant in his crime to exculpate himself
promptly and voluntarily by disclosing the property and explaining his connection with it to
government agents, must prevail over any claim
of the defendant to have the privacy of his
property maintained against a warrantless search
by such agents.39
In Botsch, the direct conflict with the defendant's expectation of privacy is not highlighted,
but the court does refer to a clear right to
exculpate:
Indeed, any individual under similar circumstances would have a right to promptly and
voluntarily exculpate himself by establishing that
his role in the alleged scheme was entirely innocent and passive.
This right to exculpate oneself also decisively
distinguishes the November 6 search from those
condemned in the so-called "hotel" cases relied
upon by our dissenting colleague .... 40
The Botsch court obviously saw the right to
exculpate as the key factor which would authorize consent in a Botsch or Diggs situation, and it
saw the absence of that factor as determinative
in other, similar, third-party consent situations.
It thus seems clear that the primary source of
authority for the third party's consent in both
Botsch and Diggs is the third party's right to
exculpate himself fiom criminal suspicion. Unfortunately, reliance upon this theory has three
disadvantages: (1) the right is difficult to limit
in its application, (2) the theory encourages
police manipulation of third-party motives, and
(3) the theory allows a third party to consent to
searches without regard to the limiting standards set forth in Matlock.
It is fairly evident that a right to exculpate
could be held to exist in a great number of cases
where such a finding is clearly unwarranted.
The determination of such an interest in the
Diggs case was not possible until after the

31544 F.2d at 120-21.
11 364 F.2d at 547 (emphasis added).
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box had been opened. Almost all cases involving locked suitcases, briefcases, automobiles
and other "concealing" items would pose the
same problem. If the box is opened with governmental participation, as in Diggs, and the
box contains purely personal, non-criminal effects, the rationale for opening the box in the
first place is gone. The third party has no
exculpatory interest unless the property is tied
to a crime; yet, the right to exculpate is used as
a justification for a governmental search before
there is any determination that the third party
actually possesses stolen property in the first
place. Such reasoning clearly would result in
searches contrary to the dictates of the fourth
amendment.
The same problem does not arise when a
showing of probable cause is required 'before
the issuance of a warrant. In that case, even if
the search turns up nothing, the rights of the
individual have been protected by the judicial
determination of probable cause. The rationale
for the search remains clear, even if the search'
is unsuccessful. "Prior authorization protects
against 'hindsight justification' and preserves
'the effectiveness of post-search review.' "4 The
third-party consent situation involves no showing of probable cause, and if a box is opened
because a party might- have an interest in that
box, the reasons for openirig the box arise only
after the box is opened and its contents disclosed. This is clearly "hindsight justification"
which allows the third party to consent to
numerous searches which are not in fact justified at all.
The problem is avoided, of course, where
the third party conducts the search privately
and then calls the governmental authorities.
He has, on his own initiative and without governmental participation, determined that there
is a need to turn the defendant's goods over to
the police, and a voluntary transfer of the
goods to the police raises no fourth amendment
issues. 42 If, however, the police are informed
prior to any investigation about the nature of
the goods in the locked box, and the box is
then opened jointly, the search clearly falls
within the fourth amendment. The search must
then be justified by a consent theory, but it has

been undertaken without the necessity for exculpation which would support consent.
Furthermore, law enforcement officers could
easily create an exculpatory interest where
none had existed, and in doing so would "endow" the third party with authority to consent.
In Diggs, for example, prior to any contact
from the third party, the police might have
traced the box to his home and indicated that
he might be involved in a criminal undertaking.
The third party, who previously had no knowledge of his possession of "hot" goods, would
immediately be possessed of the exculpatory
interest which provides a sufficient relationship
to authorize consent. A joint search of the
goods would follow, and the primary justification for the search would be the consent of a
frightened third-party consenter. The potential
for abuse is obviously inherent in any theory
which so easily allows the state to create in a
third party the authority to consent to a search.
Finally, reliance upon the "right to exculpate" theory would allow consent searches
which clearly fall outside the standards set forth
in Matlock. Matlock established that consent to
search could validly be obtained from third
parties who possess either "common authority
over or other sufficient relationship to the
43
premises or effects sought to be inspected.
The Court suggested that mutual use and joint
access or control are indications of common
authority. 4 But the third parties in the situations examined here acquired the right to exculpate before the event of their mutual use or
joint access was scrutinized. The exculpatory
right can evidently arise from the third party's
slightest fear of implication in the crime, or
from mere possession of the suspect's goods,
and permitting consent based solely on that
"right" avoids any further examination of the
third party's relationship to the items in his
possession. This reasoning in effect, circumvents the analysis of common authority required by Matlock. Thus, in Diggs, the plurality
apparently found that the "right to exculpate"
arose when the third party was placed in possession of the suspect's box. It was at this time
that the third party was "unwittingly involved
by the defendant in his alleged crime."45 Once

41 United States v. Diggs, 544 F.2d at 130 n.18

43 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,171 (1974).

(Van Dusen,J.. dissenting) (quoting South Dakota v.
Opperman. 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
42

See note 4 supra.

"Id. at 171 n.7.

45 544 F.2d at 119. The plurality later pointed out
that, "When the defendant and Christine Mahone
left the box containing the stolen money with the
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the third party was unwittingly involved, he
had the right to exculpate himself; the court
did not determine whether the third party had
the common authority necessary in order to
give consent for a search. 46 In fact, there was
no mutual use of or joint access to the property
because the third party did not have a key to
47
the box.
Bradleys for safekeeping they thereby involved the
latter in the alleged crime." Id. at 121-22.
46 The Diggs plurality did refer to Matlock, quoting the "common authority" or "sufficient relationship" standard, and then suggested that the situation in this instance was similar to one of joint
access to or control over the premises. Because of
this similarity, the defendant Diggs could be held to
have assumed the risk that the bailees might consent
to a search "when they learned the facts which
appeared to incriminate them." Id. at 122. But such
an analysis avoids the basic issue of whether the
bailees did have common authority over or a sufficient relationship to the items seized.
" The third party's possession of a key has proven
decisive in several third-party consent cases to support a finding of authority to consent to a search.
For example, in Botsch, the court, in validating the
third party's consent to a search, stressed that:
In the case before us, Stein not only possessed a
key to the shack with Botsch's knowledge and
approval, but Botsch expressly authorized him
to use it for the purpose of accepting the deliveries which flowed from the fraudulent scheme.
364 F.2d at 547. See also United States v. Green, 523
F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1975)- (third party in constant
possession of key had sufficient control and authority
over leased premises to consent to search); United
States v. Piet, 498 F.2d 178 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1069 (1974) (warehouse foreman with one of
two keys to storage area could consent to search of
that area); United States v. Mallory, 460 F.2d 243
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 870 (1972) (third
party who had key to auto could consent to search of
that auto); Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253
(5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969) (third
party's possession of key to the trunk of the auto
authorizes the third party to consent to a search of
the trunk); United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463
(4th Cir. 1962) (bailee who had keys to the auto could
consent to search of the auto).
On the other hand, when the third party does not
have a key, courts often hold the consent invalid.
For example, in United States ex rel Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1970), the third party
was a wife whose husband had left her in possession
of property but had kept the key himself. After his
arrest the wife obtained the key from the police and
assisted the police in a search. The court found that
the key, was the only means of access to the property
and that the husband had intended to keep the key
from his wife. Similarly, in United States v. Brown,
300 F. Supp. 1285 (D.N.H. 1969), a search was held
invalid because the suitcases searched were locked
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The second element of the Matlock analysis,
some type of "sufficient relationship," must
therefore be the sole justification for finding
that a third party without joint access has the
authority to consent to a search. 4 The plurality
in Diggs purported to find such a sufficient
relationship rather than look for common authority. But the right to exculpate came into
existence when the third party received the

and the consenting party did not have a key. The
court pointed out that, "a limited consent cannot be
vicariously extended to the opening of another person's locked attache case." Id. at 1288.
Diggs and several other cases suggest that a key is
simply one factor indicative of control and need not
be decisive. The plurality in Diggs argued, when
comparing Diggs to Botsch, that:
It is true, of course, that Stein had a key and
unlocked the shanty for the inspectors [describingBotsch]. We do not think that this was of any
significance with respect to the question with
which we are concerned, however. For the part
which Botsch induced Stein unwittingly to play
in the unlawful scheme required that he open
the shanty to receive the fraudulently obtained
merchandise, whereas the part which Christine
Mahone and the defendant, Diggs, induced the
Bradleys unwittingly to play required them
merely to keep the box containing the stolen
money safely for them, not to open it.
544 F.2d at 121. Judge Van Dusen, dissenting in
Diggs, argued that the third party's failure to possess
a key to the box was significant:
By retaining the key, Diggs and Chris indicated
to all who came in contact with the box that
they maintained an expectation of privacy in
the interior of the sealed container. The Supreme Court's and this Circuit's cases hold that
such a clearly asserted privacy interest is worthy
of the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 131 (footnotes omitted). Fdr cases in which a
search has been held valid even though the thirdparty consenter did not have a key to the property
searched, see United States v. Long, 524 F.2d 660
(9th Cir. 1975) (husband switched locks on house to
keep wife out, but wife could still consent to search
because ofjoint access and control); United States v.
Lawless, 465 F.2d 422 (4th Cir. 1972) (defendant's
wife initiated search without a key to the premises,
but her joint rights to the premises still allowed her
to consent t6'a search).
It is thus evident that the third party's possession
of a key can have very significant consequences, and
failure to possess a key often proves lack of the
control needed to authorize consent. But the presence of a key may not always be decisive, and other
factors may prove joint access and control even where
the consenting part) has no key to the property or
chattels being searched.
48 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
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goods from the suspect. There was no special
relationship with the goods which created the
authority to consent. Rather, the mere possession of such goods, combined with the third
party's apprehension, allowed the third party
to consent to the warrantless search.
Is the mere possession of goods which may
or may not be linked to the crime and may
often be totally unidentified, as in Diggs,
enough to create the sufficient relationship
required under the second prong of the Matlock
test? It is difficult, in light of the past search
and seizure decisions of the Supreme Court, to
argue that when a third party takes possession
of goods belonging to a suspected criminal, he
is immediately authorized to consent to a
search. The result of such an approach would
be to establish a constant rule which would
allow the apprehensive third party to consent
to a search of any items in his possession merely
because they belonged to a suspect. The Court
could not have intended this when it said in
Matlock that the consenter must have "common
authority or other sufficient relationship" to
the effects searched in order to consent. Otherwise, possession plus some minimal apprehension combine to form a sufficient relationship
and the third party who possesses a suspect's
goods can always consent to governmental
search and seizure despite the suspect's fourth
amendment rights.
Thus, when a court holds that a third party
can consent to a search because he has a right
to exculpate himself from his unwitting involvement in a crime, the court is in effect
circumventing the Matlock standards. The court
is replacing the tests of common authority and
sufficient relationship with a theory of exculpation which can support a consent search
without ever satisfying those standards. The
test of common authority is avoided because
the court can discover a right to exculpate
without necessarily finding any common authority over the goods. Similarly, the mere
possession of the suspect's goods creates the
authority needed to consent to a search and
seizure, because such possession itself creates
the "right to exculpate."
FOURTH AMENDMENT

IMPLICATIONS

Creating a right to exculpate which in some
instances would authorize a third part), to consent to a search and seizure of a suspect's

possessions has significant implications in the
fourth amendment area. The primary purpose
of the fourth amendment is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against ar4
bitrary invasions by government officials. b In

many third-party consent cases, courts have
accordingly sought to determine whether the
suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the goods given to the third party. 4 9 The
privacy analysis fits in quite easily with other
third-party consent approaches, since the defendant's expectation of privacy ordinarily
would be affected by considerations of joint
access, mutual use and common authority. If
the defendant possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in goods held by a third party,
then the latter is not authorized to consent to a
search or seizure of those items. If, however,
the suspect does not seek to protect the privacy
of the goods, but rather "knowingly expose[d
them] to the public,"' 0 then the consent was
valid. This privacy analysis became popular
after Katz v. United States,51 which made clear
that the fourth amendment protects a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy.
For
not
the
not

the Fourth Amendment protects people,
places. What a person knowingly exposes to
public, even in his own home or office, is
a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-

tion.... But what he seeks to preserve as pri-

vate, even in an area accessible5 to
the public,
2
may be constitutionally protected.
Katz did not involve a consent search situation,
and the privacy analysis has been used less
9See, e.g., United States v. Novello, 519 F.2d 1078
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1060 (1976) (no
reasonable expectation of privacy when defendant
knows others have general access to area); United
States v. Piet, 498 F.2d 178 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1069 (1974) (no reasonable expectation of privacy when warehouse foreman had keys to common
storage area in which defendant had goods); Sartain
v,.
United States, 303 F.2d 859 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 894 (1962) (defendant delivered briefcase
and means of access to briefcase to friend and thereby
largely surrendered right of privacy); State v. Curley,
171 S.E.2d 699 (S.C. 1970) (surrender of key to auto
trunk by defendant forfeits expectation of priyacy);
State v. Edwards, 490 P.2d 1337 (Wash. App. 1971)
(leaving of personal effects in another's residence
prevents finding of reasonable expectation of privacy).
50Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
51389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5

1Id.at 351-52.
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frequently in third-party consent situations
since Matlock. 53 The reduced emphasis upon
the suspect's privacy interests is largely due to
Matlock's emphasis upon the third party's relationship to the goods as the determining factor
in third-party consent cases.
However, as Diggs demonstrates, the privacy
interests of the suspect must still be considered,
even under the Matlock standards. Those factors which are indicative of common authority
also demonstrate, to some extent, the suspect's
expectation of privacy. For example, when a
suspect retains the key to a locked box but
gives the box to a third party, the retention of
the key indicates (1) that the suspect did not
wish the third party to have access to the box,
and (2) that the suspect still has an expectation
of privacy as to the contents of the box.
The suspect, of course, does sacrifice to some
extent his expectation of privacy when he surrenders possession of the goods to a third
party. The extent to which the expectation of
privacy is reduced depends largely upon the
nature of the third party's control. If the third
party is given a key to the trunk of a car and
is told that he may use the key, the defendant
certainly has a reduced expectation of privacy
in the trunk area. In People v. Pranke, the court
pointed out: "[h]ere we have a situation where
a defendant delivers his briefcase and the
means of access to it to another, thereby voluntarily surrendering to a large degree his right
of privacy." 54
The expectation of privacy analysis involves in
every case an examination into the degree to
which the defendant "surrendered" his expectation of privacy. If the property or premises
searched could not reasonably be expected to
remain private, then the search itself is reasonable and there is no need to rely upon a thirdparty consent analysis which examines the motives of the consenting party. But if the area
searched is one which the defendant could
reasonably have expected to be private, then it
is necessary to inquire whether the exculpatory
interest of the consenter should prevail over
the suspect's fourth amendment interests. It is
questionable whether such nonconstitutional
53 F. INBAU, J. THOMPSON, J. HADDAD, J. ZAGEL &
G.

STARKMAN,

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-CASES

AND

20 (1975 Supp.).
54 People v. Pranke, 12 Cal. App. 3d 935, 91 Cal.
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Rptr. 129 (1970).
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rights as the right to exculpate should he balanced against fourth amendment protections.
including the privacy interests of a suspect. 55
The third-party consent exception to the
warrant requirement permits police to search
and seize property where such a search is
"inherently reasonable." If the exception to the
warrant requirement becomes too broad, however, the exception swallows the rule and the
protection afforded suspects by the warrant
requirement is reduced. In more and more

cases, the constitutional rights of the suspect
will depend upon the predicament of the third
party who possesses property belonging to the
suspect. Courts might be encouraged to create
other such nonconstitutional rights which
would allow third parties to authorize consent
searches. For example, one court has already
found that a third-party consenter's interest in
protecting the integrity of the premises
searched was enough to outweight a countervailing privacy interest. 56 Another interest
which, it has been suggested, should prevail

over a suspect's expectation of privacy is the
interest of a third party in avoiding physical
harm inflicted by the suspect. 7 A third party
might also contend that he should be permitted
55One author has suggested that "countervailing

interest[s]" should be used to "render the defendant's
expectations of privacy unreasonable." Comment,
Thirty Party Consent Searches: An Alternative Analysi%,
41 U. CHI. L. REV. 121, 134-35 (1973). The author
suggests that a warrantless consent search is reasona-

ble if the countervailing interest of the third party
reduces the defendant's expectation of privacy. This
analysis, however, seems flawed in that it is difficult
to perceive what effect if any the third party's interests should have in defining a reasonable expectation
of privacy. In effect, the countervailing interest is
simply "outweighing" the defendant's privacy interests, and this balancing process substantially reduces
the defendant's right to privacy, even though he had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises
or property searched.
5 In United States v. Peterson. 524 F.2d 167 (4th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088 (1976). a mother
consented to a search of her son's bedroom. The
court in a footnote indicated that the mother's "interest in the integrity of the premises was clearl)
superior to any privacy interest held by the codefendants." Id. at 181 n.23.
5- "The most striking example of a countervailing
interest that would render the defendants expectations of privacy unreasonable exists where the defendant causes or threatens physical harm and the
victim seeks police aid and involves them in a search."
Comment, Third Party Consent Seihrrhe: An Alternative
Analysis, 41 U. Cm. L. REV. 121, 135-36 (1973). The
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to consent to a search in order to avoid being
called as a witness in the suspect's trial. The
question would then be whether the third party
may properly be motivated not only by a need
to exculpate himself from criminal suspicion
but also by a desire to extricate himself from
any involvement at all.
The potential for the proliferation of a third
party's rights which might prevail over the
suspect's fourth amendment interests raises a
question to what extent the recognition of such
"rights" should be encouraged. The Supreme
Court has at times vigorously emphasized the
need for cooperation of the public in solving
crimes, and it can be cogently argued that
when a third-party consenter permits the
search of a suspect's goods, he is merely cooperating with law enforcement officials in their
investigation of crimes. Reliance upon the right
to exculpate might further cooperation in law
enforcement. The right to exculpate is perhaps
analogous to the informant's "right" to supply
police with information related to criminal actix ity.5
[C]ourts ha,.e countenanced and encouraged the
use of paid informants and undercover agents
since time immemorial. The responsible citizen
who presents the police with evidence of a crime
should be no less encouraged for it is no part of
the policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth
amendments to discourage citizens from aiding
to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension
of criminals.5 9
Reliance upon the right to exculpate, or a
"right to become uninvolved" or a "right to
protect the integrity of the premises" would
increase the ability of each citizen to cooperate
with the police.
The Diggs plurality balanced the interest in
exculpation against the suspect's right of privacy and held that the third party's interest in
exculpating himself should prevail. Similarly,
author of this article suggests that such a countervailing interest on the part of the third party may in
certain instances justify the consent search.
51For an excellent discussion of an informer supplying police with information related to criminal
activity, when the informer is not a paid or hired
informer but a volunteering citizen, see Thompson
& Starkman, The Citizen Informant Doctine, 64 J.
CRIM.
L. & C. 163 (1973).
9

- 1d. at 172 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971)).

in People v. Pranke,6" the third party's right to
cooperate6 ' prevailed over the suspect's rights
because the suspect had a substantially lessened
expectation of privacy. In both Diggs and
Pranke, it is clear that the suspect's rights are
being balanced against the consenter's right to
exculpate; in each case, the court finds that the
right to exculpate should prevail ox er the suspect's right to privacy.
Such nonconstitutional rights should not pre%ail oxer the guarantees of the fourth amendment. Although the fourth amendment does
not demand that a warrant be obtained for
every search and seizure in which the government plays a role, exceptions to the warrant
requirement are meant to be "jealously and
carefully drawn. ' 62 The exceptions are not
based on a balancing of interests, but rather on
the recognition that in certain situations a
search may be inherently reasonable. 63 The
fact that a third party wishes to exculpate
himself should- not make a search of the suspect's property inherently reasonable.6 ' Furthermore, to allow a third party to exculpate
himself whenever he is in possession of a suspect's goods, by consenting to a search, would
significantly expand the consent exceptionexer increasing numbers of third parties would
be able to consent to searches based solely
upon their own desire to exculpate themselves.
Vesting such broad power in the third party is
inconsistent with a narrow and careful delineation of exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Placing more power to consent in the hands
of the third party will also seriously undermine
another major objective of the warrant requirement, the determination by a neutral magistrate regarding the need for a governmental
search and seizure. In often quoted language,
the Supreme Court has described the role of
the magistrate in the search and seizure situation:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which
often is not grasped by zealous of ficers, is not
6012 Cal. App. 3d 935, 91 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
ld. at 947, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (Fleming, J.,
concurring).
62
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
63 See note 3 supra.
6 Factors which do make a search inherently reasonable are those covered by the exceptions to the
warrant requirement. See note 3 supra. The exceptions create a category of situations in which a warrant need not be obtained because the search is
61
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that it denies law enforcement the support of
the usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from the evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime....
When the right of privacy must reasonably yield
to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided
by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or

government enforcement

agent.

65

In theory, the magistrate authorizes searches
on the basis of demonstrated probable cause,
regardless, of the third party's relationship to
the property. The consent exception recognizes
that the third party's relationship to the property may itself justify a consent search. But if
the authority to consent is based on the consenter's exculpatory motives, the magistrate's neutral determination may be avoided e%en though
the third party has no real relationship to the
property.
Allowing the third party to determine the
need for a goxernmental search is little better
than allowing "zealous officers" to do so-in
both cases, the determination as to whether
the search is reasonable is in the hands of an
individual who might be under intense pressure and subject to undesirable influences. In
United States v. Botsch, for example, the postal
agents confronted the third party with the
suspect's activities and the third party, "without
being urged, coerced or imposed upon, invited
the inspection. ' 66 The third party in Diggs consented to the search after learning of the suspect's arrest.
He became suspicious that the box in his possession might contain stolen property. Becoming
more and more distraught, he reached a point
where he could not take it any longer, contacted
FBI agents and insisted that they come to his
home immediately, even thought [sic] it was late
at night, so that the box might be opened in
their presence and the truth as to the contents
67
thus publicly revealed.
In both Botsch and Diggs, the third party is
drawing inferences from the e~idence, 61 inferclearly reasonable and therefore within the fourth
amendment.
6sJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
(1948) (footnotes omitted).
66364 F.2d at 548.
67 544 F.2d at 119.
68The plurality in Diggs points out how the third
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6
ences which result in a goxernmental search 9
and seizure of the suspect's goods. It may be
suggested that the suspect chose the third party
himself, and thus should be required to accept
the consequences. But such an argument implies that the third party has complete liberty
to do as he wisles with the property in his
possession. Ordinarily, the law does not conclude that the suspect's surrender of possession
is a surrender of his right to control the third
party's disposition of the property. 0
Where a third party is motivated, as in Botsch
and Diggs, by a desire to exculpate himself
from involvement in the crime, review of the
reasonableness of that desire would provide
some protection. 7' Without an examination of
the third party's decision to exculpate himself,
the suspect's foturth amendment privacy rights
are almost entirely controlled by the third
party. In too many situations, the third party
may be making a decision that fails to reflect
the protections guaranteed by the fourth
amendment.
It is apparent that the "right to exculpate"
poses a threat to the fourth amendment protections in general. Any number of similar rights
might be developed which would be balanced
against, and might prevail over, an indi- idual's
privacy interests. Although such rights may
carry with them important policy considerations, it is necessary to carefully define and
limit the exceptions to the warrant requirement. It also seems undesirable to allow a third

parties can draw their own inferences when it says
that the consenters, "might, when they learned the
facts which appaeared to incriminate them, disclose
its contents in order to exculpate themselves." Id.
at 122.
69 See the discussion of private searches in note 4
supra.
70White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking
about People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974
Sup. CT. REV. 165, 224.
"' In Diggs, concurring judge Gibbons stated the
issue as involving a third party who did have reasonable cause to believe he possessed contraband. 544
F.2d at 124 (Gibbons, J., concurring). But the plurality never specifically argues that the third party was
reasonable in his belief that he was in possession of
contraband. It is suggested, however, that the third
parties were aware of "facts which appeared to incriminate them." Id. at 122.
Courts have not completely refrained from examining the third party's decision to exculpate himself,
and thus a call for further examination of the third
party's decision to consent would not involve the
courts in an entirely new process in which they have
little experience. See note 15 supa.
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party's inferences, without more, to create the
authority to consent to a search. The suspect
may have given up the power to consent to a
search. The suspect may have given up the
power to prevent all searches consented to by
the third party, but it is unreasonable to suggest
that he gale the third part), complete, unrestricted freedom to consent.
A SUGGESTED SOLUTION

The right to exculpate doctrine, which allows
third parties to consent to searches when they
fear they have been implicated in a crime,
oxeremphasizes the nonconstitutional rights of
the third party, thus pro%iding inadequate protection for the suspect whose fourth amendment privacy interests are threatened. These
two competing interests could be accomodated
if the government were required to demonstrate the third party's "standing" to assert the
right of exculpation.
The government would be required to meet
two tests before the third-party consent search
would be held to comply with the Matlock
standards. First, the government should demonstrate that an "exculpatory relationship" existed by showing that the consenter knew that
the goods in his possession were in some way
connected to the suspected criminal activity.
Second, the goxernment should show that the
go%ernment agents in olved in the search were
reasonable in their belief that the third party
sought to exculpate himself. This two-part
standard is meant to insure that the third party
is. in fact, exculpating himself by consenting to
a search of the suspect's goods. 72
The first element of the standard-the showing of the exculpatory relationship to the
'; The standing concept suggested here is in many
wav similar to the standards required for use of
information supplied by informers in obtaining a
search warrant. The government, in its application
for search warrants, must demonstrate the reliability
of the informers under the rulings of Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Although Aguilar and
Spinelli have increasingly been viewed as applicable
to professional informers only, the same type of
analysis is appropriate for third-party consent. The
government, in order to prove that the third-party
consent was valid, must prove to some extent that
the consenter was truly trying to exculpate himself
and had valid reasons to believe that a need for
exculptation existed. This serves to establish the
"reliability" of the third party's belief in exculpation
as a motive, and once such proof exists, the consent
to the search can be held valid.

goods-may in many respects be seen as satisfying the requirement for all searches, as
stated in Warden v. Hayden:7 3
There must, of course, be a nexus-automatically provided in the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband-between the item to be
seized and criminal behavior. Thus in the case
of "mere evidence," probable cause must be
examined in terms of cause to believe that the
evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.74
The consenting third party might be able to
show that the goods he possesses are related to
the crime in several ways. He could suggest
that the circumstances under which he received
the goods indicate that they are related to the
crime. Similarly, he could describe the goods
and in doing so demonstrate that they are tied
to the suspect's criminal activity. If the third
party could demonstrate that he holds contraband or instrumentalities related to the crime,
his consent would have been supported by
some actual evidence that exculpation was necessary.
The application of the "standing" requirement suggested here would be administratively
practical and would to a great extent solve the
problems created by an unlimited right to exculpate. The rule would clarify for law enforcement agents the "sufficient relationship" standard which is applicable in the third-party
exculpation situations. 7 For example, assume
that a party has two trunks given him by a
friend who has recently been arrested for a
jewelry theft. The third party in possession
calls the police and they appear in order to
assist in a search. If the third party opened
one of the trunks befbre the police arrived,
and discovered it was full of jewels, a consent
search of the second trunk would be proper.
,3387 U.S. 294 (1967).
4Id.at 307.
7- See text accompanying notes 16-18 .upra. As
indicated earlier, the Diggs plurality relied upon the
sufficient relationship standard because the third
party clearly did not have common authority over
the box. It is difficult to conceive of situations where
a third party would have common authority over
goods for which he is serving as bailee, as in Diggs. If
the third party believes that he is in possession of
goods which belong to a wrongdoer, it is unlikely the
third party would himself admit to having common
authority over the goods. Thus, if the common
authority test is not satisfied, the sufficient relationship standard of Matlock must be applied, as was
done in Diggs.
7

COMMENTS
The third party could properly assert that the

goods in his possession were related to the
suspect's alleged criminal activity. If the trunks
were both locked, but had been dropped off a
few minutes after the robbery, and in a hurried
manner, the third party would again be able to
consent to a search. But where the third party
had obtained possession weeks after the crime,
and had no idea what the trunks contained, a
consent search would not be allowed. Thus if
the third party knows he possesses contraband,
or instrumentalities of the crime, he will have
the necessary standing to assert his "right to
exculpate," and a consent search is proper.
The burden on the police in such situations
is fairly light. In each instance, they must ask
the third party why he suspects that the goods
are connected to the alleged illegal activity.
Based upon the information supplied, the police must judge whether the third party has
"standing" to assert the right to exculpate. The
decision in each case will depend upon the
ability of the third party to tie the goods in his
possession to the crime.
Limiting the right of the third party to exculpate himself will greatly solxe the major problems posed by the right to exculpate. By requiring the third party to demonstrate his "sufficient relationship" to the goods beJore finding
that the right to exculpate exists, the courts
will be complying with the Matlock analysis,
rather than exading it by finding that the right
to exculpate arose from mere possession of the
suspect's goods. A prior showing that the property in his possession is connected with the
crime would axoid a hindsight justification.7 6
For example, in a Diggs situation, it is not
known if the third party needs to exculpate
himself until alter consent is given and the
sealed box is opened. Under the proposed
analysis, the third party would have to indicate
that the goods in his possession were connected
to the crime; if such a showing could be made,
the need to exculpate would be clear. The
"backward" analysis required under the current
rules could be avoided.
The third problem associated with the right
to exculpate, that of police manipulation of the
third party's motives, would be reduced but
not entirely eliminated by the standing requirer See text accompanying note 41 supra, with respect to such hindsight justifications.
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ment. Police can presently influence a third
party in order to make him belie-e that exculpation, and thus consent, is necessary. Under
the proposed standard, the police would still
be able to aid the third party in making the
needed connection between the goods and the
alleged criminal activity. The potential for
abuse, however, is more serious as the law
presently stands because police can influence a
third party's motives and convince him of the
need to exculpate even though the police haxe
little if any knowledge of his real connection to
the crime. Under the suggested analysis, the
third party could not consent unless the goods
had been tied to the crime being inxestigated.
If the third party possessed a locked suitcase,
the police would not be able to describe to the
third party the nature of the goods inside the
suitcase unless the police had such knowledge
previously. Under the right to exculpate analysis, the police, without any knowledge of the
contents of the suitcase, can pressure the third
party into believing that he should exercise his
right to exculpate. Under the proposed interpretation, the third party's consent would not
be valid unless he could describe the contents
of the suitcase and connect the suitcase to the
suspect's alleged criminal activity.
Application of the proposed standing requirement would also discourage the "creation"
of similar nonconstitutional rights which would
pre%ail o%er the constitutional right of prix acy.
The third party's interest in cooperating with
police, for example, might be limited in the
same manner that the exculpatory interests are
limited. A party might be required to demonstrate his "standing to cooperate" before being
allowed to take an action that might infringe
upon a suspect's constitutional rights. Furthermore, restricting the third party's right to consent would result in more situations in which
police would have to obtain a search warrant.
In those situations where the third party could
not establish "standing to exculpate," the police
would be forced to rely upon the meaningful
intervention of a neutral magistrate to determine if probable cause for. a search existed.
Such a limitation on the third party's ability
to consent would not significantly interfere
with police investigations. The police would
still be able to obtain as much information as
possible from the third party and would actually be encouraged to elicit such infbrmation
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in order to determine whether the third party
had standing to exculpate himself. If a warrant
were necessary, the third party's information
could aid in the determination of probable
cause. Thus, the police will not be seriously
hindered in their efforts to investigate the
suspect's alleged criminal activity; they simply
will not be entitled to possession of the suspect's
goods because the third party seeks to exculpate himself.
The interests of the third party in exculpating himself are certainly significant, and the
courts in Botsch and Diggs expressed a major
concern for those interests. But it seems wrong
to place those interests on a par with constitutional rights. The emerging right to exculpate
oneself fiom implication in criminal activity
should be limited because the expansion of this
new "right" seriously threatens the fourth

amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. An equitable result, in
light of the competing interests involved, can
be achieved by requiring that the government
make some showing of the third party's actual
need to exculpate before being allowed to conduct a consent search. Such a requirement is
administratively feasible and would not hinder,
to an undesirable extent, the investigation of
crimes. Yet the concurrent benefits to the suspect would be significant, and the standing
requirement would fit easily into the Supreme
Court's present third-party consent analysis.
The theoretical and practical benefits of the
standing requirement warrant the adoption of
such a standard in third-party, consent situations where the third party seeks to exculpate
himself from criminal involvement.
LARRY I. YELLEN

